1

JOHN GARANG AND SUDANISM:
A PECULIAR AND RESILIENT NATIONALISM

A SENIOR PROJECT SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE HISTORY DEPARTMENT
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
BACHELOR OF ARTS OF HISTORY
CALIFORNIA POLYTECHNIC STATE UNIVERSITY, SAN LUIS OBISPO

BY
MATTHEW J. DELANEY

SAN LUIS OBISPO, CALIFRONIA
JUNE 2010

2

Introduction
“You, the people, in your popular uprising succeeded in cutting off the monster’s head,
but the lifeless body continues to deceive you that the monster is still dangerous. No, It is
not! Having cut off the monster’s head, it is your sacred duty to push down the monster’s
body, not stand in fear of it.”1
These are the bold words of Dr. John Garang de Mabior, Commander-in-Chief of the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) in April of 1985. He is addressing the
people of Sudan after the recent popular people’s uprising, which overthrew the President of
Sudan, Jaafar Nimeiri. Nimeiri is seen as an oppressive dictator and is depicted as the
“monster’s head” in the opening quote. However, Garang does not only call for the removal of
the monster’s head, but for the destruction of the body as well. The monster’s body is
Nimeirism, which is a term that describes the various policies and dictatorial, exploitative actions
of President Nimeiri. Garang lists several “provocations” by Nimeiri that help give us a base
understanding of the physical manifestation of Nimeirism. Garang accuses Nimeiri of
“institutionalizing corruption and bribery,” and of “dismantling” the Addis Ababa Agreement,2
and of trying to change the Southern boundaries in order to “deprive” the South of fruitful
agricultural land.3 He also condemns Nimeiri for calling for the division of South Sudan into
three “mini-regions,”4 and for forcing all Sudanese to abide by Islamic Shari’a law.5 Finally,
Garang accuses Nimeiri of being a “one-man dictator who clings to power by means of use of
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savage repression, torture, unlawful detention, harassment and murder of innocent citizens by the
security apparatus.”6 Garang resolves that he is prepared to “fight a long war” in order to defeat
all “institutions of oppression that have been evolved in Khartoum to oppress the masses of the
Sudanese people.”7This is the monster that John Garang sought to destroy in his lifetime.
Nimeirism is a model of oppression against which John Garang pitted his efforts of liberation. In
defiance of Nimeirism, Garang offered a new nationalism, which he called Sudanism, which
recognizes the ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity of Sudan and calls for a new, uniquely
Sudanese identity that acknowledges all of this diversity in Sudan.8 Garang’s Sudanism is
therefore inherently opposed to divisiveness and separatism, and is disposed to unity. This thesis
examines the wars between Sudanism and Nimeirism and Sudanism and secessionism in the
context of the second civil war in Sudan starting in 1983. In the following pages I will argue that
John Garang remained consistent and persistent in heralding a new, united Sudan based on
Sudanism. Sudanism was at heart a nationalist movement. Using James L. Gelvin’s model of
the development and nature of nationalisms I will demonstrate that Garang’s Sudanism was a
peculiar but authentic form of nationalism.9
Garang had a vision for a new, restructured Sudan based on a nationalism of Sudanism
rooted in optimism and hope for the long neglected, exploited, “excluded” and impoverished
people of Sudan. He fought with fervor against the oligarchy of the Northern Arab elites, with a
hope of redistributing power to all the different peoples in Sudan, in order for there to be peace
and prosperity for all.
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John Garang and the Jonglei Canal
The foundations of Garang’s nationalism can be detected in his dissertation on the
“socio-economic” development of the Jonglei Canal, which he writes at Iowa State University in
1981. Garang writes at a time when the “vast agricultural production potential of Sudan is
estimated at more than 200 million feddans suitable for agricultural use.”10 One feddan of land is
1.038 acres, which means that Sudan was estimated to have 207,600,000 acres of viable
agricultural land.11 Garang continues that it is based on this estimation that he views Sudan as
the potential “Breadbasket of the Middle East” as a “major granary of the world.”12 He saw this
as a national goal that should serve to benefit all of Sudan, not just the more industrialized
North.13 Garang supported the modernizing of agriculture in Sudan, in part to help sustain NorthCentral and North Eastern Sudan, which is located in the mostly desert region of Sudan.14 He
criticized the Executive Council of the National Council for Development Projects because they
were only offering “marginal improvements” to the inhabitants near the Jonglei Canal in
southern areas where most of the rainfall takes place.15 This implies that the Khartoum
government was continuing its legacy of neglect of the Southern Sudan by manipulating the
Jonglei Canal to benefit Khartoum. Although the source of most of the rain water used by the
canal would be located in the South, Khartoum neglected Southerners and used their resources to
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benefit the “minority clique regime.”16 Garang perceived it to be Khartoum’s responsibility to
make the transition from subsistence agriculture to “modern commercial production” through
“deliberate government policy” and interventions in traditional agriculture.”17 All of this should
take place according to national goals and interests.
According to John Garang, the construction of the Jonglei Canal was a necessary step for
modernizing agriculture in Sudan and for realizing Sudan’s agricultural potential. If properly
used for the common good of all Sudanese, then it would have been highly beneficial. However,
Garang suggests that Khartoum’s facilitation of the canal did not espouse “regional equity,” and
was a continuation of its historical neglect of non-Northern regions, especially of the South. As
we will see later, Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) halts the building of the
Jonglei Canal in order to weaken the Khartoum government. He claims to have stopped the
canal project until power is taken from Nimeiri.18 Garang’s goal will be that the benefits of the
Jonglei Canal will be distributed among all Sudanese for the benefit of all.
Garang’s goal for the use of the Jonglei Canal for the “common good” of all Sudanese
coincides with Gelvin’s ideas about nationalism, and how nationalist ideologies are based on the
“common interest” or the “common good” of the people. Gelvin writes that “all nationalists
believe that nations possess something called a ‘common interest,’ and it is the role of the state to
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promote it.”19 As a nationalist who promoted Sudanism, Garang sought to utilize the Jonglei
Canal for the benefit of Nubians, Darfurians, Arab Northerners, Dinka, Nuer, and all Sudanese
alike. He perceived the agricultural benefits of the canal as being a common interest of the
“Sudanese” nation that he represented. The case of the Jonglei Canal is also interesting in the
context of Gelvin’s theory about nationalist movements because he emphasizes the connection
between the “spread of modern world economic and state systems” and nationalism in the
Middle East.20 The purpose of the Jonglei Canal is to facilitate more reliable agriculture to all
regions of Sudan, and to realize Sudan’s potential to be a source of agricultural abundance and
proliferation. Any nationalist movement in Sudan must represent the people who are served by
the Jonglei Canal. Garang wants the canal to serve everyone within Sudanese borders (as were
delineated by the British at independence), and therefore his nationalism represents all ethnic
groups in Sudan. From Garang’s perspective, therefore, the Arab Northern government sought
to serve itself with the Jonglei Canal and virtually neglect all other Sudanese, and had a
nationalism that represented Arabs in Sudan. Hence, the Khartoum government under Nimeiri
implemented Shari’a and obliged every Sudanese of all races and religions to adhere to Islamic
law.21 They sought to create an Arab national identity that discriminates many Sudanese people
by default. In this effort, they used the Jonglei Canal to benefit Arabs. John Garang had an
inspiring hope for Sudan that sought to benefit all regions with equity. It was a sleepless hope
that fought ardently to provide abundance to all Sudanese peoples who have long suffered under
neglect and exploitation.
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Nimeirism and Sudanism
John Garang defines Nimeirism as a policy of divide and rule that oppresses the people of
Sudan.22 He says that
“the oppressor has divided the Sudanese people into Northerners and Southerners;
Westerners and Easterners…while in the South, people have been politicized along tribal
lines resulting in such ridiculous slogans as ‘Dinka Unity,’ ‘Great Equatoria’, ‘Bari
Speakers’, ‘Luo Unity’ and so forth. The oppressor has also divided us into Muslims and
Christians, and into Arabs and Africans.”23
According to Garang, separatism, or sentiments among Southerners that called for
secession from the North, was a result of oppressive divide-and-rule tactics by the ruling elite.
The divisions reflected in the Nimeiri regime were meant to weaken the “just cause” of the
Sudanese people. Nimeiri had perpetuated the “neo-colonial system” in which a “few people
had amassed great wealth at the expense of the majority;” the “few” being those of the “minority
clique regime.”24As was mentioned earlier, Garang formally lists Nimeiri’s offenses against the
Sudanese people. Garang’s overarching theme is that Nimeiri exploited and neglected all
Sudanese outside of the oligarchy of the Arab ruling elite with policies of divide and rule, and by
abrogating the Addis Ababa Agreement, which ended the first civil war in Sudan in 1972. He
points out that Nimeiri wanted to “deprive the South of mineral rich or prime agricultural land
such as Hofrat el Nhas, Kafia Kingi, Northern Upper Nile, Bentiu, etc.”25 He boldly condemns
this resource exploitation and says that “natural resources, wherever they are found in the Sudan,
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belong to the whole Sudanese people.”26This is easily applicable to the case of the Jonglei Canal,
where Khartoum wanted to manipulate the Jonglei Canal to benefit Khartoum; making the rest of
Sudan a low priority. Similarly, Garang argues that Nimeiri promoted an Arab nationalism that
only served Arabs in Sudan. The full extension of this nationalism is seen in the implementation
of the “September Laws” of 1983, which forced all Sudanese to abide by Islamic Shari'a law.27
This does not necessarily mean that Nimeiri’s motivation for implementing Shari’a was for
reasons of Arab/Islamic nationalism. It reflects the sentiment of Arab/Islamic nationalists who
wanted to make Sudan an Arab/Islamic nation. Also, Arab nationalism and Islamic nationalism
are not necessarily the same thing, although they may go hand in hand. Ultimately, in Garang’s
perspective Nimeirism is a practice of rule that keeps power in the hands of a few (Arab
Northern elites) at the expense of the masses.28 It is also inherently divisive and does not
promote unity among the many different ethnic groups of Sudan, but is exploitive and
oppressive. In following Gelvin’s argument about nationalism, we can conclude that Garang’s
nationalist ideology was formed in response to Arab and Islamic nationalisms in Sudan. Gelvin
articulates that “all nationalisms arise in opposition to some ‘other’” and that they are “defined
by what they oppose.”29 Sudanism is defined as the enemy of sectarian nationalisms, against
models of dictatorial rule such as Nimeirism, and against secessionism as we will see later.
Garang struggles against nationalist ideologies that seek to oblige diverse Sudanese peoples to
adopt a strictly Arab, African, Christian, or Islamic identity. Sudanism is among the many
nationalist ideologies that “defines itself by what it opposes.”
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For Garag, Nimeirism, as a force of opposition to Sudanism, embodies all oppressive
regimes in Sudan. It can continue to exist even though the physical person of Jaafar Nimeiri may
die. This is evidenced when Garang refers to the “continuation of Nimeirism in a different
uniform”30 and to the “struggle against all faces of Nimerism.”31 Nimeirism is the face of
“sectarian chauvinism” and “religious bigotry.”32 It creates and perpetuates the suffering of
Sudanese civilians. John Garang’s nationalism, Sudanism, is the antithesis of Nimeirism.
Garang’s Sudanism is committed to the “establishment of a NEW and democratic Sudan
in which equality, freedom, economic and social justice and respect for human rights are at the
core.”33 Sudanism seeks the liberation of the “whole” Sudan and the unity of its people and its
“territorial integrity.”34 Its goal is to “enable the masses, and not the elites from different regions,
to exercise real power for economic and social development of their regions.”35 Garang’s
nationalism fights against separatism and heralds the unity of all Sudanese of all races, genders,
religions, and ethnicities. It recognizes that Sudan’s identity can be self-defined and decided by
the people.
In a statement at the Opening Session of the Preliminary Dialogue between SPLM/SPLA
and the National Alliance for National Salvation at Koka Dam on March 20, 1986, Garang stated
that the British went to America and formed a new nation, and although Americans have British
origins they do not claim to be British, but American.36 He also argued that “Argentineans speak
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Spanish and are Christians, but they are Argentineans not Spaniards and are proud of being
Argentineans.”37 His point is that Sudan can create its own “unique Sudanese civilization” or a
New Sudan.38 By asserting that Sudan can create its own national identity, Garang confirms
Gelvin’s argument that nationalist movements create nations.39 Nationalist movements do not
bring “preexisting nations to a state of self-awareness,” but they are the authors of their own,
“imagined” nation-states.40 Garang recognized the validity of all religions, languages, cultures,
and ethnicities in Sudan. An example of this is when he says that “there are Muslims and
Christians in both the North and South, but some Sudanese are neither” and that “religion should
never be a divisive force.”41 Sudanism recognizes that there are many different religions that are
practiced in many different regions of Sudan, and that all of these religions should be accepted
under the umbrella of the New Sudan, which represents all Sudanese peoples. The New Sudan
will “contribute to the Arab world and to the African world and to the human civilization.”42
Sudanism replaces Arabism, Africanism, Islamization, Christianization, and all other forms of
sectarianism. It encompasses all of these religions and cultures and expresses them as a uniquely
Sudanese identity. Since Sudanism is democratic, it is inherently irreconcilable with
sectarianism of any kind.
In a conference with John Garang regarding the relief crisis at the U.S. Capitol in June
1989, Garang elaborates on the problems of Sudan that are addressed in Sudanism. The
problems that he describes are dealt with under the umbrella of Sudanism. He says that Sudan
has “over 400 different ethnic groups” and that although it is a “multi-nationality country” the
37
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Khartoum governments since 1956 have “treated the Sudan as a mono-nationality.”43 He
continues and says that the Sudan is a multi-religious country, but Khartoum governments “favor
one religion, Islam,” which is fully expressed in the imposition of Shari’a law.44 According to
Garang “nobody is anybody’s minority and nobody is anybody’s majority. We are all Sudanese,
full stop.”45 He believed that the union of Sudan’s numerous ethnicities, cultures, and religions
eliminated the concept of a minority. Everyone has equal representation and everyone is a
majority. From this perspective there is no “Southern problem” because if there is a problem for
anyone in Sudan, no matter what region, then it is also the problem of all Sudanese. Garang’s
Sudanism fought to create a New Sudan “in which all nationalities and all the religious groups
coexist.”46 Arabs, Africans, Christians, Muslims, Dinka, and Nuer are all united under Sudanism,
and none is valued above the other.47 The unity of diverse people groups is fundamental to
Sudanism. Let’s remember that Garang is referring to diverse groups of people that all reside
within the “piece of real estate” that was given to them by the Anglo-Egyptian colonial
government at independence. Garang could have chosen to support a Southern Sudanese
nationalism, or a Dinka nationalism, or something of the like but he did not do this. This makes
his nationalism peculiar and distinguishable from other nationalist movements in Sudan. This is
especially peculiar when analyzed in juxtaposition to Gelvin’s argument about Zionism and
Jewish nationalism. He claims that Jews needed their own “homeland” as a result of the antiSemitism that they faced in Europe and Russia, and that Zionism called for Jews around the

43

Garang, “Excerpt from John Garang’s Policy Statement, 12 July 1988,” in Khalid Call for Democracy,

44

Ibid., 192.
Garang, “Response of John Garang to Dr. El-Gizouli, 1 September 1985,” in Khalid Call for Democracy,

192.
45

92.
46

Garang, “Seminar with John Garang de Mabior at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. Friday, 9
June, 1989,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 213.
47
Garang, “Speech by John Garang, 9 April 1985, following the downfall of Nimeiri,” and “Statement by
John Garang on 26 and 27 May 1985,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 42, 58.

12

world to “embrace the idea that they constitute a single nation, united as in the case of all
nations, by the ties and travails of history.”48 Garang was categorized as a black “African” from
the Dinka ethnic group. Africans have been historically marginalized and categorized as inferior
to other groups such as Arabs and Europeans. Sudanism represents the excluded and oppressed
peoples. Zionism is, in part, formed in response to Jewish marginalization and exclusion.
However, unlike Zionism, Garang’s nationalism did not seek to unite all “Africans,” but included
all peoples within the Sudanese territory, including Arabs. Zionism does not do this, but instead
unites all Jews, observant and nonobservant alike. It does not invite other non-Jewish people
groups to be a part of its nation. This is what makes Sudanism distinct from other more universal
nationalist movements such as Arabism and Zionism. It is very much its own in that it sought to
unite many different people groups within Sudan, and to include even those such as Arab ruling
elites who had historically sought to unite Sudan according to Arabism in a discriminatory way.

Origins of Sudanism
John Garang’s “search for Sudanism” was a result of Sudan’s pre-colonial and colonial
history. He says that “modern Sudan is a product of historical development before, during, and
after the alternate colonial rule of the Turks, the British, and the Egyptians” and that “our
immediate task is to form a new Sudan.”49 Garang acknowledges the importance of colonial
Turkish, British, and Egyptian influences in shaping Sudan’s contemporary ideas of nationalism
and identity. Sudanism seeks to make sense of and reconcile the identity crisis wrought from
Turkish, British, and Egyptian influence. It is hard to understand the significance of Sudanism
and its origins if we do not understand the Ottoman and Anglo-Egyptian influence on Sudanese
48
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identity. Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule also influenced the territorial delineation of the present
Sudan. It is within this delineated territory that John Garang sought to unite all ethnicities, races,
and religions.
Perhaps the best synopsis of this history is provided by the well acclaimed author on
Sudanese identity, who served as the United Nations secretary-general for internally displaced
persons, Francis M. Deng.50 Hundreds of years BCE Arab traders settled among the Sudanese
and were very affluent.51 This association between Arabs and wealth gave Arabs privilege
among the Sudanese. In the seventh century the Arab Muslim Empire invaded and conquered
the Sudan. Arab Islamic wealth and privileged position made them an “appealing class for
intermarriage with the leading Sudanese families.”52 Few Arabs settled in the South due to
natural barriers.53 In 1820-1 the Turko-Egyptian forces took over the northern region of Sudan
and it was a regime that was “politically and ideologically Islamic.” The Turko-Egyptian regime
was committed to Islamic orthodoxy through Shari’a law, or Islamic laws that applied to the
whole country. Their main reason for occupying Sudan was to obtain African slaves for the
Egyptian army. The Turko-Egyptian regime exacerbated notions of black African inferiority, and
reinforced the superiority of Arabism and Islam. It also introduced Shari’a law, which
previously played “a minor role in Sudanese life.” The Sudanese opposed the Turko-Egyptian
rule and saw them as “infidels” who were not deeply religious.54 The Turko-Egyptians were then
overthrown by Muhammad Ahmed al-Mahdi (a Northern Arab) in the Mahdist revolution in
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1885.55 The Mahdist regime maintained an Islamic identity in the Sudan, and slave raids
continued in the southern regions of Sudan. Shortly thereafter a joint British-Egyptian
Condominium force conquered Sudan in 1899.56 The British implemented separate
administrations for the North and the South, and favored Islamic education.57 This is a part of
Britain’s “separatist” policies that worsened divisions between Northerners and Southerners.58
Many British administrators “adopted” Arab attitudes toward African Southerners and regarded
them as savages.59 Finally, the colonial administration spent much of their effort developing the
North politically, economically, socially, and culturally, but ignored the South and left them
“isolated, secluded, and undeveloped.”60 This is the historical backdrop from which John Garang
forms his nationalist idea of Sudanism. This is a very superficial, brief history of the Arabization
and Islamization of Sudan, and there are many details missing. However, it gives us a base
understanding of the development of Arab/Islamic superiority (or of the “Arab hegemony”) in
the North, and the neglect and inferiority bestowed on the African Southerners.
We see this progression of the Arab/Islamic identity in Sudan, and the neglect and
“exclusion” of the South. Garang recognized that the current racial disparities and class
distinctions between Northern Arabs and Southern Africans were a result of historical
development. He understood that the current divisions between Arabs and everyone else in
Sudan took centuries to develop, and are firmly rooted in Sudanese history. Deng suggests that
Anglo-Egyptian colonial policy in Sudan exacerbated these divisions, and that ultimately, these
divisions led to the first civil war in Sudan in the 1950s. Garang took up arms against an
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unyielding division between the North and the South with his vision for a united Sudan. He
claimed that in
“1956 our country gained formal independence and entered the era of neo-colonialism.
Since then a small parasitic clique from pre-independence system of exploitation took
over the former instruments of oppression for their own interests and against the wishes
of the majority of the Sudanese people.”61
John Garang points out a “neo-colonialism” at work in the Sudan that has adopted the oppressive
policies of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule in the form of a “domestic colonialism.” He
used Sudanism as an opposing force against the colonial legacy left by the Anglo-Egyptians and
against the domestic colonialism of the Northern Arabs. The development of the Sudanese
identity and of the “Arab hegemony” was quite apparent to Garang. He concedes that Sudan’s
“major problem is that it has been looking and is still looking for its soul, for its true identity.”62
Therefore, Garang offers a new identity for Sudan that does not promote the exploitation or
discrimination of any races, ethnicities, or religions. Sudanism is adamant about this equality
because Sudanese history has constantly seen the aggrandizement and escalation of the Arab race
and the exploitation and neglect of other races, especially of Southern Africans. It is peculiar
that Garang should seek to unite two groups of people who have become progressively more
dichotomized and completely divided. The Arab-African division has grown worse over many
centuries, along with the development of the Arab ruling elite in the North who have neglected
the Southern Sudanese. This would cause one to wonder why Garang did not initially support a
nationalism that favored separatism and self-determination for the Southern Sudanese.
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Garang’s response to this is that “the oppressor,” which represents any ruling party or
person in the Sudan that has oppressed and exploited the masses, has “time and again played
various politics in order to destroy and weaken the just struggle of our people, including that
most historic policy of divide and rule.”63 One of President Nimeiri’s main provocations of the
Sudanese people was his “redivision” of the Southern Sudan into “three mini regions” in June
1983, which Garang claims is “consistent with his policy of divide and rule.”64 It is clear that
Garang viewed secessionism as a perpetuation of divisiveness in Sudan that had only served to
weaken the Sudanese people, not empower them. Garang clearly articulates this view when he
says that “it was therefore natural that secessionist movements…developed in different periods
in different areas of Sudan thereby jeopardizing the unity of the people and prolonging their
suffering and struggle.”65 Secessionism is merely a manifestation of the inherent “divide and
rule” tactics of the oppressor. It does not help the cause for peace and prosperity of the exploited
Sudanese, but actually weakens their struggle and “prolongs their suffering.” Garang heralded a
nationalism that opposes secessionism with the same zeal as it opposes the minority clique
regimes. He makes this undeniably clear when he says that “if anybody wants to separate even
in the North, we will fight him because the Sudan must be one. It should not be allowed to
disintegrate or fragment itself.”66 He is talking about a piece of real estate that we call Sudan,
but that has territorial boundaries that were delineated by the British. Using Gelvin’s model,
clearly Garang is “inventing the notion that a population used to exist” in Sudan that had a
“common interest” and that this united population should not be allowed to “fragment itself.”67
63
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Garang’s commitment to the unity of the invented Sudanese “nation” is ceaseless. Sudanism has
absolutely no tolerance for secessionism of any kind. Both secessionism and minority clique
regimes are enemies of Sudanism.
Another reason for Garang’s adamant policy of unity for the Sudan, and his intolerance
of secessionism is because the first rebel movement of the Southern Sudan in the first Sudanese
civil war that began in the 1950s was a secessionist movement. Garang points out that during the
formation of the SPLA/M in 1983 there was “bitter struggle” for six months in deciding the
direction of the Movement because many separatists wanted a Movement that was “similar to the
Anynya I rebel movement” of the first civil war that called for a “separate and independent
Southern Sudan.”68 He exclaims that the “forces of reaction and separatism were defeated.”69
This language and description of the struggle between unity and separatism reflects the enmity
between Sudanism and secessionism. Garang comments on the Anyanya I Movement and says
that the “separation of the South was the primary objective of the Anyanya Movement.”70 He
disagrees with this position and instead concludes that the
“problem in the Sudan is not that of the South separating or the West separating or the
East separating, it is essentially a problem of justice. If justice is brought about then
nobody would wish to separate and so we would build a unity of the country.”71
In Garang’s model of nationalism, justice is brought about by the complete restructuring of
political power in Khartoum, so that all races, religions, and cultures are represented in Sudan.72
With this restructuring of power comes the implementation of Sudanism--a Sudanese nationalism
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that unites all ethnicities, religions, and cultures in Sudan under a secular, democratic, socialist
system that honors human rights.73

Factionalism and Secessionism
Garang’s unyielding determination for Sudanese unity, and his intolerance of
secessionism, created much factionalism among the SPLA leaders and other Southern Sudanese.
This is not to say that Garang’s unity policy was the only source of factionalism, but it definitely
played a substantial role. The Anyanya II movement, one of the first Southern factional rebel
groups in the 1980s, opposed the SPLA on ideological grounds. In some statements, the
Anyanya II accuses Garang of being a Communist and of wanting to spread communism
throughout Sudan.74 Gabriel Gany, a council member of the Anyanya II, also points out that the
Anyanya II movement wanted “federal rule in the South while the SPLA fought for liberating the
whole Sudan.”75 They also accuse Garang of human rights abuses against the Southern citizens,
and of dictatorial leadership.76 Ultimately, it is ideological differences between the Anyanya II
and Garang that play a substantial role in the fierce Southern conflicts.
The SPLA-Nasir faction was another prominent, Southern rebel faction that opposed
Garang’s SPLA/M on ideological grounds. The Nasir faction was formed in August of 1991
when two former members of the High Command of the SPLA, Riek Machar and Lam Akol
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issued a radio message to the SPLA that called for the removal of John Garang from
leadership.77 This call for his deposition was outlined in a tract titled “Why Garang Must Go
Now.”78 Initially Machar and Akol based their defection from the SPLA/M on the dictatorial
leadership of John Garang79and accused him of committing countless human rights abuses
against SPLA/M members.80 However, on January 24, 1992 the SPLM/A Nasir faction
expressed their goals for Southern self-determination and the separation of the South from the
North.81 The Nasir faction did not endorse Sudanism, and saw the hope for a united Sudan as
unrealistic.82 We can see that issues of ideology are fundamental to factional movements against
the SPLA/M. At a delegation between Lam Akol and the Nasir faction with the Nigerian
Government, it was pointed out that “secession is the will of the Southern people and Garang
knows this very well.”83 It was concluded that Garang’s movement was “doomed” because it did
not reflect the goals and “aspirations” of the Southern people.84 There is a real fervency against
Garang’s mission for a united Sudan based on Sudanism. We see bold condemnation of
Garang’s nationalism that claimed that he was not representing the will of the people, but that he
was instead promoting a self-interested nationalism. According to Gelvin’s argument this would
invalidate his Sudanism because it did not reflect the “common interest” or “common good” of
the people that it was attempting to unite. Garang faced much opposition from Southern
separatists, which resulted in many human rights violations and the slaughter of innocent
civilians by all parties involved. Sudanism cannot co-exist with separatist ideologies, and this is
reflected in the violent conflict between Garang’s SPLA/M and the Anyanya II and Nasir
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faction. There may have been other reasons for the dissension between the SPLA/M and the
Anyanya II and the Nasir faction, but among these sources of conflict, issues of ideology always
arise.
There are claims against John Garang’s unity stance, as was mentioned earlier, that say
that the sentiment of the Southern people was for secession and self-determination. Therefore,
separatists concluded that Garang was not fighting for the “common interest” of the Sudanese
people. In the 1990s, there was a lot of pressure put on John Garang to change his position for a
united Sudan, and to concede to self-determination and secession for the South. This would
inevitably forfeit the implementation of Sudanism. Scholars tend to agree that the unity policy
was important for causing factionalism.85 There is overwhelming unanimity among scholars
regarding the Southern sentiment toward secession. Most acknowledge that the majority of
Southerners favored secession over a united Sudan, and that they fought under John Garang with
this underlying sentiment in their hearts.86 Obviously Lam Akol, John Garang’s opponent,
agrees with scholars and claims that the “Southern Sudanese received the call for a United Sudan
with great skepticism and finally total rejection.”87
There is a strong case to be made for this reality, because it is hard to understand why
there was so much factionalism and internal, violent Southern conflict, unless John Garang was,
in fact, not representing the political goals and hopes of the Southern Sudanese people.
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Although Garang claimed to be fighting on behalf of all of Sudan, not just the South, it is
important to mention the South because this is the group that has faced much of the historical
marginalization and exploitation by the North. The South comprises many of the oppressed
peoples for whose liberation Garang claimed to fight. Therefore, if Garang did not represent the
sentiment of the Southern people then his movement was not for the “common good” of all.
Obviously there are other reasons that fueled and perpetuated Southern, factional conflict, but
ideology definitely seems to play a role. This is especially seen in the fact that the SPLA-Nasir
faction and the Anyanya II Movement posed secessionist goals for the South in their public
statements and documents.
Garang’s opposition to Southern secession can best be explained by comparing it to
Arabism and Zionism. Gelvin claims that Zionism seeks to unite all Jews into one nation and
into one identity.88 Arab nationalisms seek to unite people within different territorial boundaries
according to Arab culture. Garang’s Sudanism does a similar thing, but it is hard to discern this
because he sought to unite 400 different ethnic groups into one Sudanese identity. Garang saw
the eclectic Sudanese population as bearing an undeniable, distinct Sudanese identity in the same
way that Zionists see Jews as all being distinctly Jewish, and as Arab nationalists see Arabs as
being distinctly Arab. This elucidates Garang’s motivations for struggling against secessionism
and for detesting the fragmentation of the Sudanese nation. This, of course, is only relevant if
Garang’s nationalism promoted the true “common interest” of all the people of the “invented”
Sudan.
If Sudanism does not reflect the majority sentiment of the marginalized people of Sudan,
then it seems that it is a self-interested nationalism. It is not a valid nationalism according to
Gelvin if it does not reflect the “common interest” of the Sudanese populace. Sudanism is not a
88
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legitimate movement of liberation if it is only favorable to Northern Arabs, because Garang’s
movement is meant to liberate people from the oppression of the Arab hegemonic system that
has exploited the non-Arab Sudanese. I am not saying that Garang’s nationalism was appealing
to the Northern Arabs, although some argue that a united Sudan was appealing to Northerners,
but I am saying that if it did, then it would not be a nationalism of the Sudanese masses.
Garang’s movement called for the overthrow of the existing Northern Arab political ruling
system, for the restructuring of power, and a redistribution of that political power equally among
all people groups of Sudan under a united Sudan. However, this model is futile and unreflective
of Southern aspirations if the marginalized people of Sudan favor secessionism, and not unity.

Southern Sentiment: Unity or Secession?
The extent of the Southern sentiment about secessionism is difficult to ascertain.
Obviously there is dissension at the Southern political level, as one of the main tenets of the
Southern factional movements called for an independent, self-determined South Sudan. If there
was a majority sentiment for secession in the South, then at the very least it was not strong
enough to oust John Garang from his position of Commander-in-Chief of the Movement. This
does not mean that there was not a strong secessionist sentiment in the South, but it simply
means that it was not overwhelming enough to unite all of the Southern Sudanese under a
secessionist position. Whether or not Garang’s Sudanism reflected the true aspirations of a
majority of the marginalized Sudanese masses is hard to say in the context of this paper. I will
say that John Garang remained consistent and persistent with his goals for a united New Sudan in
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the era of factionalism, while Riek Machar and Lam Akol seem to have compromised their
objectives and the objectives of liberation for the Southern Sudanese.
The genesis of the Nasir faction headed by Machar and Akol is a helpful starting point for
tracing the political progression of the two faction leaders. In a radio message to all units of the
SPLA on August 28th, 1991, they claimed that Garang had been “deposed” as the Chairman of
the SPLA/M and that Riek Machar would “take over as the interim leader until a National
Convention was called to elect the leader of the Movement.”89 The reality is that Garang was not
deposed and that he remained the leader of the SPLA/M. If this were not the case then he would
not have been introduced and addressed as the Chairman of the Movement at different peace
meetings thereafter. Machar and Akol’s declaration against Garang did result in the creation of a
new Southern faction and did have some popularity, but it did not have the restructuring effect
for which they had hoped. If the Southern sentiment was so overwhelmingly secessionist and
anti-Garang then it should have been unanimous enough to depose Garang. It was not strong
enough to overthrow him though. It certainly weakened the movement as it resulted in brutal
conflict between Southern factions and in the wanton slaughter of thousands of civilians.
After unsuccessfully attempting to overthrow John Garang, Machar and Akol began to
collude with the Khartoum government and receive government military support to combat John
Garang’s SPLA-Torit.90 The government also supported other anti-Garang groups such as the
Anyanya II and Arab militias militarily in order to weaken Garang’s SPLA Movement.91 The
Nasir faction, the Anyanya II Movement, and the Arab militias such as the Murhallin, all
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committed inhumane atrocities against Sudanese civilians, especially against the Dinka.92 One of
the most notorious acts of atrocious violence against civilians by government-sponsored Arab
militias is the massacre of approximately 1,500 Dinka civilians in the town of Al-Daein in
1987.93 Amnesty International accused Machar’s Nasir faction in 1993 of killing approximately
2,000 Dinka.94 Garang’s SPLA also has a record of human rights abuses, although it is less
atrocious then that of government funded Southern factions and militias. I point out the atrocities
of the Nasir faction in order to show that Machar and Akol initially oppose Garang because of
his dictatorial and inhumane leadership, and because Machar and Akol claimed to support the
true secessionist goals of the Sudanese masses. Yet, soon after the genesis of the Nasir faction,
they began receiving military support from the government, and then commit heinous human
rights abuses against Southern Sudanese civilians. The Nasir faction especially targeted Dinka
civilians because of their association with John Garang. John Garang was a Dinka,95 and had
been accused by some as leading a Movement that was seeking Sudanese domination by the
Dinka. Riek Machar was a Nuer, which is sometimes seen as a rival of the Dinka, and there are
scholars such as Sarah E. Hutchinson who make strong cases for the tribal nature of the conflicts
between Garang’s SPLA and Machar’s Nasir faction.96 This aspect of the Southern factional
conflict is too dense for the scope of this paper, but is necessary to mention when discussing the
violent acts of inhumanity committed by all of the Southern factions including Garang’s SPLATorit faction. To reiterate, however, Dinka civilians associated with Garang were not only
targeted by the Nasir faction, but were also heavily targeted by the Arab militias employed by
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the government, as is seen in the Al-Daein massacre of 1987. Why is it that the Nasir faction
claims to represent the secessionist sentiments of Southerners and for their liberation, but also
colludes with an oppressive government and massacres Dinka civilians? Were the Dinka people
so unanimously pro-Garang that the Nasir faction felt it necessary to slaughter them in order to
accomplish secessionist goals for the suffering Sudanese? Machar’s Nasir faction was not alone
in its human rights abuses. Garang’s SPLA also committed its share of human rights violations
against suffering Sudanese civilians and dissenters within the SPLA, which obviously
perpetuated the conflict between the Nasir faction and Garang.97 However, if the oppressed
people of Sudan were so anti-Garang and so pro-secession, then the Nasir faction would not have
needed to garner a lot of military support from the “minority clique regime” and massacre
civilians in order to defeat Garang. The truth may be that anti-Garang and pro-secessionist
aspirations were not as prominent as Machar and Akol had claimed. This does not mean that
Garang reflected the majority sentiment of the marginalized Sudanese, but it does mean that he
had enough support to remain the leader of a prominent rebel army in Sudan.
I argue that there were two reasons for the collusion of the Nasir faction with the
Khartoum government. The first is that the Nasir faction lacked the resources and the popularity
to overthrow John Garang, and therefore had to acquire government support. Secondly, as is
widely accepted, the Khartoum government continually instigated Nasir-Torit conflict and used
the Nasir faction to weaken the whole Sudanese rebel movement.98 This fits perfectly into John
Garang’s ideology that the “oppressor” constantly seeks to “divide and rule” the Sudanese
people to their demise. The government supported the Nasir faction in order to divide the whole
rebel cause, and then continue to exercise control and exploitive power over them. Clearly,
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Garang must have despised the Nasir faction’s adultery against the Sudanese people as they slept
with the enemy in Khartoum.
Eventually Riek Machar’s faction, which changed from being the Nasir faction to the
Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), along with four other Southern Sudanese
rebel factions, signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the government in April of 1997.99
These five Southern rebel factions “fused” together to become the United Democratic Southern
Sudan Salvation Front (UDSSF). In that same year President Omar Bashir, who is currently the
dictator of Sudan and who has a notoriously poor human rights record, “issued a decree” that
made Machar the president and ruler of the Southern Coordination Council for a period of four
years.100 It is essential to note that Machar was appointed this leadership position by the
command of the government, not by the decision of the Southern Sudanese people. A little more
than a year after the signing of the Khartoum peace agreement there was already “fierce
fighting” within the UDSSF. Paulino Matip, a pro-government commander at Bentiu, and
another faction called the Bor group, both defected from the UDSSF because they claimed that
Riek Machar “was unfair in distributing posts when he set up the administration in the south.”101
Although the Southern factions herald separatism, and claim to represent the true aspirations of
the South, there is much internal conflict and dissension. Machar compromised their objectives,
and compromised the long-term liberation of the Sudanese people by receiving government
support to commit atrocities against pro-Garang civilians in the first place. Not only this, but
Machar becomes a tool in a so called “democratic,” government-run machine that only leads to
more factionalism, and leaves the Sudanese identity unresolved. In this light, I do not believe
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that the Southern factions represented the true sentiment of the Sudanese people regarding
secession and unity. According to Garang’s Sudanism, which calls for the overthrow of the
current government and the complete restructuring of political power, Machar compromised the
hope of Sudan. It makes sense that Machar and other Southern factional leaders would end their
struggle against the government after more than a decade of ceaseless violence and civilian
misery. Nonetheless, they submitted to the “oppressor” and enabled him to continue the legacy
of marginalization and discrimination of non-Arab Sudanese. The Nasir faction and all other
Southern Sudanese factions failed according to Garang’s nationalist model because they did not
achieve a new national identity for Sudan that recognized all ethnicities, religions, and cultures
as being “Sudanese.” Garang did not recognize the validity of the Khartoum Peace Agreement
because it did not solve Sudan’s fundamental issues of identity.102 The Khartoum Peace
Agreement signified the submission of those of the “just” cause, and could only appease the
Sudanese masses for a short time. Garang’s Sudanism could not prevail in a political system that
was still regulated and controlled by the same oppressive government as before. He remained
zealous for long-term Sudanese unity that redefined the Sudanese identity. It seems that he was
correct to not compromise his goals by joining the UDSSF, because internal violence and
conflict ensued within the “united” Southern factions shortly after the signing of the Khartoum
Peace Agreement. Sudanism could not be nurtured or bear fruit under the stipulations of the
Khartoum Peace Agreement.
Ultimately, we can, at the very least, conclude that John Garang was fervent and
unyielding in his pursuit of Sudanism. While adamant secessionists such as Machar and Akol
compromised their own objectives and colluded with the “oppressor” to the detriment of
102
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countless civilians, John Garang remained consistent about achieving a new united Sudan that
was democratic and that did not discriminate based on race, religion, or culture. He continued to
fight for a new Sudanese identity that was an eclectic combination of all the races, religions, and
cultures in Sudan, and that redefined the Sudanese identity.

Ethiopian Influence on Garang’s Position of Unity
Having questioned the validity of the unanimity of the Southern sentiment for secession,
and arguing for Garang’s genuine persistence in fighting for a new, united Sudan, let us consider
Garang’s nationalist agenda in the context of Ethiopia’s political and military support of Garang
and the SPLA/M. It could be argued that John Garang remained adamant about achieving a
united Sudan because he was receiving political/military support from Mengistu’s Communist
Ethiopian regime at a time when Ethiopia was fighting the separatist rebellion of Eritrea. In fact,
some have made this argument or an argument similar to it, which, at the very least, recognizes
the close connection between Garang and Mengistu.103 Part of this argument is reinforced by the
claim that after the fall of Mengistu’s Marxist regime in 1991, Garang began gravitating toward
more secessionist-type policies such as self-determination.104 Eritrea waged a “secessionist” war
against Mengistu’s regime and earned their right to self-determination and ultimately voted for
its independence from Ethiopia in 1991.105
It is true that Garang began promoting policies that were more favorable toward selfdetermination, and which seemed to be progressing toward secession. Most notably in the 1990s
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and onward, he espoused a policy of confederation, in which the North and the South would have
had separate constitutions.106 In an interview with Kenyan TV in 2000, he clarified that this
confederation would be for an interim period of two to four years until the issue of the separation
of religion and state was resolved, or more specifically the repeal of Shari’a law.107 This policy
basically offers self-determination to the Southern Sudan, which contrasts with Garang’s former
position that opposed self-determination. Garang’s espousal of confederation seems to
contradict the tenets of Sudanism, and seems to forfeit the hope of a united Sudan that represents
all ethnicities, cultures, and religions. However, Garang defends his confederation policy against
these accusations in a couple of ways. He basically claims that confederation is a last resort and
that it is only a policy option because the Khartoum government will not “abandon Shari’a, and
that the south refuses to be governed by it.”108 Shari’a law was so inherently discriminatory
against the Sudanese people who Garang sought to liberate, that it forced him to compromise for
a policy of confederation. Confederation is not a primary option for Garang by any means, but it
was the only way that he could maintain the liberation struggle for the Sudanese populace in the
midst of Northern stubbornness regarding the separation of religion and state. In a press
interview in 1997 he defended his nationalist motives for a united Sudan against accusations of
growing secessionist sentiments in his movement. He exclaimed that
“Our objectives on the unity of Sudan have been principled and firm since 1983. We
fought for it and continue to stress and adhere to this unity. Talking about unity in
absolute terms creates vagueness. We are talking about a real unity on the ground, a unity
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based on the historic and contemporary diversity of Sudan, a unity I am proud of and one
I am ready to defend.”109
Six years after the fall of the Ethiopian regime, Garang still heralds the vision for a united Sudan
with audacity and steadfastness. Some think that Garang had underlying secessionist motives,
but I disagree. It is clear that confederation was not an attractive option to Garang, but was
merely a better option than living under the regime of “clique-chauvinism” that perpetrated the
racial, religious, and cultural oppression to which the Sudanese people had become so miserably
accustomed. He did not call for blatant secession like Machar or Akol, and even his advocacy of
self-determination is in the hope of a future united Sudan.
Garang reaffirms his position multiple times, including in an interview with an Egyptian
Magazine in 1998 and he says
“The issue of a confederation came as a reaction to the government's stance and refusal to
have a united Sudan on the basis of certain principles - the most important of which is the
separation of religion and state. They rejected our proposal and hence we demanded a
confederation because peoples from different religious faiths cannot live under a
theocracy. This is the real reason.”110
Garang’s nationalism situates itself in opposition to Arab and Islamic nationalisms, because
nationalisms define themselves according to what they oppose as Gelvin argues. Sudanism could
not exist in the Arab dominated political system that forced all of its citizens to adhere to Islamic
law. Therefore, it would have to lay dormant in a system of confederation until a united Sudan
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could be achieved; if it can ever be achieved. Sudanism can only be implemented when the
existing political system is overthrown. Garang called for the complete restructuring of political
power in Sudan and the repeal of Shari’a law so that there is complete equality of representation.
It is only after this restructuring of power that the nationalism of Sudanism can be realized.
The SPLA/M’s close relationship with Mengistu’s Ethiopian regime very well may have
obliged Garang to maintain a position that favored a united Sudan. However, Garang’s hope for
the “whole” Sudan as becoming the “Breadbasket of the Middle East” seems to be proof of less
self-interested motives for espousing a united Sudan. Also, for successive years after the fall of
the Ethiopian regime, Garang continued to maintain a fervent hope for Sudanese unity and for
the liberation of the Sudanese people from discriminatory and oppressive regimes; from
Nimeirism essentially. When Garang concedes to a system of confederation, he does it in the
interest of a truly united Sudan for the future. He allows confederation because it protects
Southerners and other Sudanese people such as the Nuba from the discrimination of the
Arab/Islamic North. Garang’s favor of confederation seems to follow Abel Alier’s logic that “if
a Northern government continues to want a new Sudan based on Islamic fundamentalism then
Southern Sudan will be forced to seek independence.”111 This does not mean that Garang
supported independence, but independence does seem inevitable if the Khartoum government
does not yield in its pursuit of a purely Arab/Islamic identity for the Sudan. Confederation is
not meant to be submission to secession, but is meant to leave the Sudanese people with an
option for achieving a new, united Sudan.
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The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005
A final analysis of John Garang’s commitment to Sudanism is best made by observing the
stipulations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed by the SPLA/M and
the Government of Sudan in 2005. Some important stipulations in the agreement, for our
purposes, include the right of the Southern Sudanese to self determination, which offers them the
opportunity to vote on a referendum in 2011 that will decide whether or not the Southern Sudan
will secede from the North or remain united.112 The agreement also states that there will be a
separate Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), whose president would be John Garang until
elections for new legislators and representatives are held after the six year interim period.113 A
main priority of the GOSS is to be a link between the Khartoum government and the Southern
Sudanese people during the interim period, and to govern the affairs of Southern Sudan as a part
of a wider, national, united Sudan.114
In some ways the CPA resembles a separation between Northern and Southern Sudan,
and seems to pave the way for secession. This would cause us to infer that Garang had adopted
secessionist sentiments and submitted to separatist policies. He addresses the issue of the self
determination of the South as is stipulated in the CPA by saying that his hope for Sudan is that
self-determination will result in the Sudanese people deciding by their “free will” to be a united
Sudan.115 His hope was for a “voluntary” unity of the Sudan that upholds “honor and dignity for
all its citizens regardless of their race, regardless of their religion, and regardless of their
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gender.”116 If this equality is not achieved, then Garang concedes that the “union” between the
North and South will be peacefully severed through the self-determination of the South.117 The
independence of the Southern Sudan is therefore an option for John Garang when he signs the
CPA in 2005. This is fundamentally different from his policies of the 1980s, which vowed
complete enmity with all secessionists.118 Especially, when previously in the 1980s, Garang
condemned secessionism as a tool of the “oppressor” used to “divide and rule” the “excluded,”
suffering Sudanese people.119 Amidst Garang’s lucid “compromise”of his previous aspirations,
he still hoped for a united Sudan. Secession was not his hope for the future of Sudan, but was
instead a buffer, or a safe-guard against falling back into the “old Sudan” of oppression and
Arab/Islamic clique regimes. Garang claimed that he aspired for a “real paradigm shift from the
old Sudan of exclusivity to the new Sudan of inclusivity achieved not through force but through
the exercise of the right of self determination.”120 Self-determination is meant to reflect the
Southern Sudan’s “common interest” for a united Sudan. It is not meant to result in the
secession of the South, but is to be the realization of genuine Sudanese unity. Circumstance
most certainly forced Garang to compromise some of his initial policies, but not necessarily at
the expense of Sudanism. It seems that Garang resolved that he could change some of his former
policies without jeopardizing the implementation of Sudanism. He also submitted to “actually”
allowing the people to decide their fate rather than continue to wage a hauntingly brutal and
vicious war that seemed to have no end. He gave the Sudanese people the opportunity to create
their own nationalism, as Gelvin might agree. They can either be Southern Sudanese
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nationalists, or Arab nationalists, or Dinka nationalists, or Nuer nationalists, etc. The only nation
that will be validated globally will be the one that is created and implemented as a result of the
referendum in 2011. All of these nationalist ideologies are valid in so much as they truly reflect
the aspirations of the people in the nations which they seek to create.
After 22 years of civil war, John Garang still hoped for and deeply advocated a united
Sudan that accepted a new national identity of Sudanism. To reiterate, Sudanism is a national
identity that refutes an Arab national identity, refutes an African national identity, and refutes
both a Christian and Islamic national identity, and instead fuses all of the different religions,
ethnicities, and cultures into one, uniquely Sudanese national identity. This is his peculiar
nationalist ideology.

Conclusion
Using James L. Gelvin’s argument about nationalist ideologies, which states that nations
are created by nationalists and that nationalisms must promote the “common interest” of the
populations of the nations they create, we have traced the development of John Garang’s
nationalism of Sudanism. John Garang was a nationalist and his movement was nationalist at the
core. Sudanism is defined in opposition to all nationalisms and political practices that do not
include the “excluded” and that do not unite all of the ethnic groups, religions, and cultures
within the territorial boundaries of Sudan. It also opposes secessionism much in the same way
that a Zionist would oppose dissension among Jews who refute the idea of global Jewish unity.
John Garang remained consistent and persistent in his pursuit of his nationalist agenda, and
hoped for a united Sudan and for a new, distinctly Sudanese identity.
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To the great tragedy of those who shared John Garang’s optimism, and who trusted in
him to implement a viable peace for the “excluded” Sudanese, John Garang was killed in a
helicopter crash on a flight from Uganda to Southern Sudan on the weekend of July 31, 2005.121
The question of whether or not Sudanism will die with him will be decided in the Southern
referendum vote in 2011. It is then that we will learn the true sentiment of the Southern
Sudanese people. Will they adopt a new, permanent national identity based on Sudanism? Or
will they fulfill the claims of many scholars, and decide to be an independent nation that is not
united with Northern Sudan? Will Sudanism ever be realized, or will it merely die and be buried
among many other unrealized nationalist ideologies in recent history? Is John Garang’s death
the “for-itself moment” of the Hegelian dialectic of Sudanism,122and will Sudanism only be
realized after his death, or is he just another dead rebel?123 Did Dr. John Garang de Mabior push
down the monster’s body, the body of Nimeirism, or does the monster still stand? Is the monster
falling or is it lifting itself up, only to ruin the hope of Sudan? It is the people who removed the
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monster’s head in the first place, and it will be the people who decide what becomes of its body.
If Sudanism is to be the sword with which Nimeirism is permanently slain, then it will be the
people who wield it. May they wield this sword in unity and “dig out a mountain with
shovels!”124
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